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From constitutional rule to loosely
coupled spheres of liquid authority:
a reflexive approach
MICHAEL ZÜRN
Director at WZB Berlin Social Science Center and Professor of International Relations, FU Berlin
E-mail: michael.zuern@wzb.eu
This article develops a reason-based social foundation of new forms of authority,
which often are liquid and sectorally limited. The recognition of authority hinges, in
this view, on reflexive actors who are aware of their own limits of rationality regarding
the lack of either information or a perspective that allows for the pursuit of common
goods. In such a reflexive concept of authority, authority takers tend to monitor the
authorities closely, and the internalization of the subordinate role is not a necessary
part of it. Reflexive authority is embedded in the acceptance of a knowledge order that
reproduces the authority relationship. In spite of a tendency toward
institutionalization, reflexive authority often comes in a liquid state of aggregation,
and almost always with a restricted functional scope. Moreover, this new set-up of
authority creates social dynamics that add to liquidity. First, the encompassing
constitutionalized rule with majoritarian decision making as major source of
legitimacy is increasingly undermined by loosely coupled spheres of specialized
authorities, which are most often justified on the basis of expertise. We can observe
both the rise of international authorities in the absence of coordination between
them, and the rise of similar authorities within the nation state that escape control
of the democratic core institutions. As a result, authority gets fragmented and
different authorities need to adjust to each other. The second implication of the
argument is that democratic legitimation narratives become rare, leading to an
ongoing legitimatory contestation of authorities. Both these processes make
authority even more liquid.
Keywords: reflexive authority; legitimacy; spheres of authority;
fragmentation; contestation; democratic paradox
Liquid forms of authority are ‘characterized by a lower degree of
consolidation and a significant dynamism in the configuration and recon-
figuration of authority structures’. These forms of authority defy the notion
of authority as ‘the right to command’, and thus question the mental map
of ‘solid authority’ with far-reaching implications for our understanding
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take up this characterization of current forms of public authority and carry
it on by theorizing their social foundations. For this purpose, I will develop
a reflexive conceptualization of authority and legitimacy that emphasizes
their epistemic foundations in a globalized society. In such a reason-based
account, authority hinges on subordinates’ perception of limitations of
their own rationality. At the same time, reflexive authorities are under
permanent scrutiny. They do not operate through demands but through
requests, and they need to leave choices for the addressees of authorities.
Nevertheless, they can induce deference and even get perpetuated via
objectivization and institutionalization. Reflexive authority therefore
comes often, but not always in a liquid state of aggregation. In addition,
it creates social dynamics that even increase liquidity over time. This
contribution first proposes that the encompassing constitutionalized rule as
archetype of solid authority is increasingly undermined by loosely coupled
spheres of specialized authorities. Loosely coupled spheres of authorities
may collide and interact with each other, but they are not centrally
coordinated by meta-authorities. The rise of loosely coupled spheres
of authority cuts across different levels of governance: we see the rise of
international authorities in the absence of coordination between them, as
well as the rise of authorities within the nation state that escape control
of the democratic core institutions, such as parliaments and governments.
As a result – and this is the second proposition – the legitimation of reflexive
authority becomes contested. Both of these processes add to the liquidity
of authority.
The meaning of authority in global governance
The foundational treatment of authority in modern social sciences is still the
one by Max Weber in his sociology of domination. He defines authority
and domination as the chance
that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a
given group of persons. It thus does not include every mode of exercising
‘power’ or ‘influence’ over other persons. Domination (‘authority’) in this
sense may be based on the most diverse motives of compliance: all the
way from simple habituation to the most purely rational calculation of
advantage. Hence every genuine form of domination implies a minimum
of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or
genuine acceptance) in obedience (Weber 1978 [1925], 212).
Authority thus describes an asymmetrical relationship between actors
that is recognized by both sides. The core of such a relationship is deference
of the subordinate party to the authority holder describing a specific form
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of power.1 This holds for different strands of thinking about authority.
Horkheimer (1987 [1936], 24) describes authority as ‘approved dependence’,
according to Arendt (1957, 117) authority ‘always demands obedience’ and
for Simmel (2009 [1908], 130–1) authority ‘presupposes in large measure […]
a freedom of those subject to the authority; it is, even where it seems to ‘crush’
them, not based on coercion and pure resignation alone’.
An authority relationship plays out in specific, but recurrent situations
and thus contains a certain stability over time. To the extent that authority
describes an ongoing relationship, it expresses a form of hierarchy, and
therefore it is necessary to legitimate it. Authority thus can be abstractly
grasped as a continuing relationship that is reproduced by subordinates
deferring to the authority holders and by authority holders justifying it in
terms of common interests and goods.
This notion of authority consisting of the components of deference,
perpetuation, and legitimation captures the paradox that is built into such
relationships: voluntary subordination. Such an understanding is open for
different sources of authority. According to Weber, authority can be
based on simple or dull habituation [dumpfe Gewöhnung] as well as on
instrumental rationality. He maintains that both the disciplining of
subordinates through manipulation and internalization, as well as well-
reasoned decisions by autonomous actors, can be the source of authority
relationships (see also Sending 2017). He brought in the socialization-based
perspective not by disavowing, but by critically questioning the sources
of authority. He pointed to the reason-based perspective not with the goal
to equate authority and legitimacy, but to allow for the possibility that
authority relationships may be rational in a functionally differentiated
society.
In the next three subsections, I will develop a concept of reflexive authority
which – not least due to the specific context of global governance – starts out
as reason-based (or actor oriented), but does not exclude the possibility of
internalization and habituation. I then continue to show how liquid authority
becomes institutionalized and point to the legitimatory predicaments of
reflexive and liquid authority in global governance.
Reflexive authority
Reflexive authority is reason-based and differs from traditional authority.
Traditional authority points to a social relationship and a form of power
1 Power is thus a more encompassing category that includes all instances in which a will
prevails against resistance (Weber 2013a, 211). See Simmerl and Zürn (2016) for a more detailed
account of the core meaning of authority.
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that is, according to Arendt (1970, 45), characterized by ‘unquestioning
recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persua-
sion is needed’. In contrast, the recognition of reflexive authority does not
equate with blind and mindless submission.
The reflexivity in reflexive authority relationships is twofold. On the
one hand, it speaks to an element of ongoing reflection about the quality
of the authority holders. While reflexive authority involves dispensing
with an exact examination of the specific judgment or decision – because
such an examination would involve enormous efforts and recognition
on the basis of trust appears reasonable – it, at the same, involves a
permanent monitoring and consideration of the standards that make an
authority appealing and trustworthy. For instance, most people would
believe in the climate models of a Nobel laureate without checking all the
parameters and equations – which would take quite a long time. At the
same time, the credentials and the reputation of the models are checked
permanently.
On the other hand, these advantages do not exclusively derive from a
rationalist conception based on pre-defined interests. It is especially in
situations without pre-defined interests that reflexive authority plays out.
By providing information and new perspectives, authority may even shape
actors’ preferences. A listener may re-evaluate his wealth preferences after
listening to the climatologist. As Furedi (2013, 52) states, ‘[t]he need for a
concept of authority only emerges when communities are forced to contend
with uncertainty about questions who to believe, trust, follow or obey’.
In the case of reflexive authority, the recognition of external authorities is
based on the knowledge about the limitations of one’s own rationality, and
thus the dependence on epistemic constructions that identify these limits.
This form of self-reflection on the side of authority holders points to the
second component of reflexive authority.
Reflexive authority thus has advantages for both the authority holders
and authority receivers. In this sense, I follow the ‘service conception’ of
authority as developed by Raz (2006). At the same time, it points to a
special role of information and epistemic processes.
Reflexive authority seems especially apt to capture the relationship
between international institutions and governments of states.2 The
conceptualization of international institutions –which is based on a private
law paradigm, according to which states produce consensually passive
treaties in order to serve their interests – is increasingly questioned. Both
International Law and International Relations have developed approaches
2 For reasons of convenience, I use the term ‘state’ in the remainder when I talk about the
government of a country, unless indicated otherwise.
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to capture the new quality of international institutions.3 In this view, the
core decision makers of international institutions consisting of the leader-
ship of the secretariat and the executive representatives of the more
powerful states may exercise authority over other states. According to the
notion of reflexive authority, states recognize the authority of international
institutions when they provide valuable information and when they request
from the perspective of impartiality to do something in order to achieve
common goods or goals. States, however, do not accept unquestionable
commands to do things they do not like to do at all. States are actors that
have various established mechanisms for reflecting about obligations in the
international realm – both within the government and outside in the form of
expertise in the parliament, universities, and think tanks. It therefore seems
dubious that states do subordinate themselves to international institutions
without further questioning as most conceptions of authority want it. The
deference toward the International Criminal Court or the willingness to
accept the authority of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly
contains an element of reflection. A ruling of the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body can therefore be considered and
taken seriously without complying with it. In the case of labeling of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the European Union (EU), for
instance, accepts to pay fines for their GMO policy, thus affirming the
WTO’s authority, without following the prescription to change their policy.
Reflexive authority does not usually work with ‘commands to do x’,
but rather with ‘requests to consider y’ (see also Krisch 2017). Reflexive
authorities do not usually give reasons that underlie a command.4 No
international organization (IO) can ask a state to ‘ignore’ the so-called
national interest. IOs do not ‘command’ states. They can ‘request’ to take
into account information and reasons as a means to pursue international or
global goals. The authority of transnational and international institutions is
often based on something that is labeled ‘secondary reasons’ in pragmatist
philosophy. Especially in cases where one is uncertain about the primary
reasons for making a decision (for instance, ‘Is the food good in this
restaurant?’), secondary reasons (such as ‘If they have a certificate, it must
be good’) become decisive.5 This deference to the certification scheme,
however, excludes neither an own judgment afterwards (‘The food was, in
3 See von Bogdandy et al. (2015) for a succinct survey and discussion.
4 Raz (2009) uses these concepts to equate authority with commands and separate it from
requests. See Enoch (2014) for a critique. He understands protected reasons as a combination of
exclusionary and other reasons.
5 See Legg (2012) for a treatment of secondary reasons of the national discretion in the
implementation of human rights.
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spite of the recommendation, mediocre’), nor the possibility to shift to
another certification scheme after negative experiences have multiplied.
Different reflexive authorities may compete with each other, thus allowing
for forum shopping.
Moreover, according to the logic of secondary reasons, it is not the
perceived ‘duty to follow’ – emphasized by many scholars of traditional
authority – toward the authority that is decisive. One does not usually
follow a restaurant guide because one feels a duty to the restaurant guide.
Secondary reasons do not create a duty to follow. In fact, states usually
follow IO prescriptions because they feel that the authority is doing a good
service. Even if states feel an obligation to follow, this obligation is hardly
derived from a ‘right to rule’ – a formula often emphasized by theorists
of traditional authority. States usually do not follow IOs, because they
recognize their right to rule. If states feel an obligation to follow, they feel a
duty toward their fellow states to contribute to the public good or toward
future governments not to destroy the reputation of a country. It is thus not
IOs’ ‘right to rule’ that is at stake, but the willingness of states to take into
account and to consider requests and interpretations from IOs.
This concept of reflexive authority differs from other important con-
tributions to authority in International Relations that build on such notions
like commands, right to rule, and obligation to follow, and are often asso-
ciated with the notion of solid authority. First, socialization-based accounts
of international authority that prevail in post-structuralist and critical
accounts aim at debunking the knowledge order (episteme) that underlie
authority relationships and lead to unquestioned and internalized
subordination (Ashley 1988; Anghie 2007; Adler and Pouliot 2011). Yet,
deference to transnational and international institutions is often not inter-
nalized, but is permanently under observation. This does not exclude
internalization per se, which is however not a necessary part of the story in
global governance. Many of the new authorities are young, and they target
corporate actors, which often have significant analytical capacities. In this
situation, dull obedience based on an internalization of the authority rela-
tionship can be expected to be rare. The concept of reflexive authority does
also not depend upon the internalization of the norms postulated by the
authority, as Hurd (2008) suggests. Moreover, even when deference to the
authority gets internalized over time, this should not be equated with an
internalization of the norms postulated by the authority. The payment of
taxes to states, for instance, is rather ‘grudgingly’ accepted, without being
transformed into an internalized desire to pay, even if the state, as authority,
is recognized or even internalized (see also Haas 1983).
Second, and in contrast to other reason-based accounts of international
authority (see, e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006), reflexive authority emphasizes the
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role of episteme – or knowledge orders – as constitutive background of
authority relationships and deference (see also Sending 2017; Venzke
2013). Lake (2009, 2010), who significantly contributed to a reason-based
understanding of international authority, has analyzed the bilateral rela-
tionships between the United States and its allies. According to his analysis,
the smaller partners recognize US leadership in return for protection and
the provision of collective goods. Therefore, authority expresses a right to
command, which needs to be acquired and thus results from a social con-
tract based on interests existing independently of the epistemic foundation
that constitutes authority. In this conceptualization, however, deference
evaporates. If the recognition of an authority is completely fluid and can be
explained completely with a reference to pre-defined interests, then it is the
outcome of negotiations and not the authority relationship as such that
is accepted. Such a perspective misses the special epistemic role of the
authority holder. All the classical figures of authority – the theological
father, Hegel’s master, or the judge – have a cognitive component that can
roughly be described as ‘knowing better’. Authority relationships are thus
embedded in and reproduce belief systems and interests, and must be
conceived in a broader sense than just a right to command.
The epistemological grounding of authority relationships points to the
relevance of the social process in which superior knowledge is established
(see also Sending 2017). The notion of reflexive authority does not depend
on the assumption that those who are considered as authorities are indeed
closer to the truth. It rather points to social processes of knowledge pro-
duction and the role of science therein. The whole notion of ‘scientification’
of social processes, on the one hand, indicates the importance of science in
this process; on the other, those parts of the society who question these
authorities often question science as such. Those who reject genetically
modified food, for instance, tend not to challenge the results of studies
which point to the non-hazardousness of these products. They rather doubt
whether science can assign ethical considerations an appropriate place, and
whether science is able to take the ‘unknown unknowns’ into account.
Most strategies that aim at de-legitimating authority therefore involve
epistemic challenges to the dominant knowledge order. For instance, many
transnational movements are challenging international institutions ques-
tion neo-liberal thinking at the same time.
To sum up, reflexive authority is not only in form, but also in substance
different from solid authority. In such relationships, the authority holder
sends requests instead of demands, and authority takers tend to monitor the
authority closely. The internalization of the subordinate role is not a
necessary part of it. Whereas reflexive authority can, under special
circumstances, transform into dull habituation, especially on the side of
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those actors that lack informational and monitoring capacities, this is not a
constitutive part of it. Reflexive authority is based on the acceptance of a
knowledge order that reproduces the authority relationship. At the same
time, the underlying knowledge order is dynamic. Moreover, reflexive
authority is always under scrutiny by the addressees of authorities, whether
it delivers and is in line with the expectations. Both of these aspects lead
to permanent contestation and adjustment of the reflexive authorities. This
makes reflexive authority ceteris paribus more fluid than traditional
authority (see Krisch 2017).
Perpetuation of reflexive authority
Without commands and a right to rule, can international institutions
as reflexive authorities be consequential after all? The answer is yes,
and the reason is processes of perpetuation. If we describe authority as
the chance to achieve deference in specific recurrent or in all situations
within a social relation, then recurrence is built into that definition.
As authority contains more than brute force and is not based on case-specific
persuasion, it describes an ongoing relationship between two social actors
that contains a specific epistemic element of recognizing the authority as
‘knowing better’. While such a relationship may, in some cases, emerge
spontaneously – for instance, in crises situations – the future of this
relationship will not forget the spontaneous moment.6 Any authority
relationship has therefore a tendency not to be a one-shot instance, but to be
durable for at least some time. Talking about authority thus points to the
inscribed tendency of transforming an asymmetrical relationship into
hierarchy. Such a transformation can come in form of either ‘objectivation’
or of ‘institutionalization’.
An authority relationship is ‘objectivized’ if the knowledge order that
underlies the relationship becomes a dominant worldview or ideology that
reaches beyond the immediately involved actors. It is then a shared under-
standing reaching beyond the direct authority relationship that the
authority holder represents the ‘objective’, ‘non-particularistic’ perspective.
This role assignment can be more or less formalized. Scientists with public
appeal are cases of this role assignment. To the extent that this role
assignment gets broadly accepted, objectivation points also to social pres-
sure and coercion. If an actor rejects insights that are seen as ‘objective’ and
6 If there is a fire in a theater, a fewmay turn out to coordinate the exit movement without any
such pre-assignment. If the same group of people that spend the evening in the theatre would sit in
an airplane and an emergency evolves, it would be likely that the passengers look at the same
people asking for injunctions.
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unquestionable, the danger of social exclusion and being seen as weird
arises. In this case, the voluntariness of subordination is reduced. Similarly,
if a political regime is worldwide broadly perceived as democratic and
human rights observing, it can more easily depict a violent opposition as
terrorism that needs to be combatted than an authoritarian dictatorship. It
is then the external recognition of the (democratic) authority holders that
allows them to be coercive to their opponents.
Moreover, in some cases, reflexive authority can transform into indirect
coercion when third parties are dependent on the targets of authority. For
instance, many lenders take the judgment of rating agencies as guidance,
without checking the judgments in each individual case and without feeling
an inscribed duty to follow these requests. Rating agencies thus exercise
reflexive authority over lenders. In this way, rating agencies also exert
pressure on states to follow the policies that give them a good rating;
otherwise borrowing becomes impossible or at least more expensive. It is in
this indirect way in which reflexive authority can become coercive.
Objectivation, therefore, is one mechanism through which even secondary
reasons and liquid authority can turn out to be very consequential. Liquid
authority does not mean inconsequential authority (see Krisch 2017). As
the saying goes, constant dropping wears away a stone.
In global governance, the ‘institutionalization’ of reflexive authority is
the most important mechanism through which authority relationships
become consequential. An authority relationship is institutionalized
when the decisions and interpretations are taken by an institutionalized
body. Especially reason-based accounts point to institutionalization,
to law and assignment of institutional competences as mechanisms of
perpetuation. Governments represent an ideal type for this form of
authority perpetuation.
What types of reflexive public authority can be distinguished in global
governance? Are there good measures to show that such liquid authority
has gained in importance over time? In order to show the relevance of
reflexive authority in the international and transnational realm, two basic
types of public authority can be distinguished: the authority to make
decisions, and the authority to provide interpretations. The authority to
make decisions can be labeled ‘political authority’, the authority to make
interpretations can be called ‘epistemic authority’.7
7 This distinction is different from the one between ‘in authority’ and ‘an authority’. Political
and epistemic authority refer to different activities (decisions vs. interpretations) and not to the
type of actor constellation exercising it. While it is true that political authorities are most often
(with the important exception of charismatic authority) exercised by individuals as representa-
tives of institutions (in authority), not every epistemic authority is exercised by individuals.
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In the case of ‘political authority’, stipulations, rules, and norms are
viewed as ‘binding’ for a certain collective. Political authority rests on the
acknowledgment that there needs to be an institution that is authorized to
make collectively binding decisions in order to promote the common good
and to prevent chaos. Political authorities thus have the right to make
decisions that violate the particular interests of members in the short term.
Political authority rests on a cognitive framework that permits a common
interpretation of the common good. A political authority may have the right
to enforce rules, but its influence does not rest on force alone.
Newly institutionalized political authorities have emerged in the last
decade, especially on the transnational and international level. The princi-
ple that a given territory is governed exclusively by the national government
does not hold any longer. International institutions circumvent the consent
principle by taking decisions through forms of majority voting or through
the informal dominance of hegemonic powers. Majority decisions and
the exercise of dominance by strong countries enhance the capacity of
international institutions to act by avoiding vetoes by single states and
overcoming blockades. Today, roughly two thirds of all IOs – in which at
least one major power participates – have the possibility of taking decisions
by a majority vote (Breitmeier et al. 2006; Blake and Payton 2008).
Moreover, states are increasingly delegating power directly to IOs. The
authority index developed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks show a
marked increase in the last decades. Their standardized delegation index for
78 IOs rose from 23.5 in 1975 to 33.2 in 2010 (Lenz et al. 2015).
To the extent that the new international institutions exercise political
authority, they set rules that reduce the room of maneuver of national states
and govern formerly domestic affairs either directly or indirectly. Especially
powerful states aim to use such authorities to exercise influence outside of
their territory; at the same time, they often try to limit the authorities’
influence on their own affairs. On the one hand, the most important IOs
with majority voting also come with weighted votes or even vetoes – the
IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations Security Council are the best
known examples. On the other hand, powerful states keep in the possibility
of evaluation and of shifting loyalty, and they even create circumstance in
order to extend these options. The notions of ‘counter-multilateralism’
(Morse and Keohane 2014) and ‘deliberate fragmentation’ (Benvenisti and
Downs 2009) point to this strategy: powerful states recognize ‘multiple’
authorities with overlapping competences in order to put pressure on
authorities to act not against their interests, and in order to keep the option
of shifting loyalty. Less powerful states often do not have this option, and
therefore are less able to maintain choice in such a relation. Non-state
actors and individuals have, of course, even less possibilities to circumscribe
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political authorities. In this way, reflexive authority goes hand in hand with
institutionalized inequality (Viola et al. 2015).
In general, it seems odd to conceive the practice of international and
transnational political authorities in line with the mental map of solid
authority as ‘commands’ issued by one actor that are expected to be obeyed
by a second, and regularly backed up by force (Lake 2009, 18). Political
decisions by reflexive authorities are, in principle, permanently monitored
by those who are subjects of political authority, and they do not necessarily
provide exclusionary reasons for actions. They sometimes come with the
right to enforce decisions – as in the case of the Security Council – but more
often come without it. Even the EU had no sanctioning capacity for a long
time. While the subjects of reflexive political authority accept an induce-
ment to defer, they keep alternatives and the exit option open, and thus
keep it liquid. This capacity, however, varies across different targets of
authority.
The other basic type of authority can be labeled ‘epistemic authority’.
Epistemic authorities provide interpretations that structure the behavior of
others. Epistemic authority is based on expert knowledge and moral
integrity. The views and positions of an authority are adopted because
they appear to be both knowledgeable and nonpartisan at the same time.
Epistemic authority is based on the assumption that knowledge and
expertise are unequally distributed, but that there is a common epistemo-
logical framework that makes it possible to ascertain knowledge inequality.
An epistemic authority needs not, in all cases, convince people factually and
in detail. It is, therefore, not the quality of the specific argumentation, but
rather the general reputation of an institution or a person that is decisive.
What is involved is governance by reputation (Schuppert 2010, 94) and by
indicators (Davis et al. 2012).
The significance of institutions with purely epistemic authority has
unquestionably increased on the transnational level. This particularly
includes influential and ‘credible’ non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as Greenpeace in the environmental area, or Amnesty International in
the area of human rights, which are active in setting as well as monitoring
norms. The growth of transnationally active NGOs has been enormous –
today there are roughly eight times as many of them as there were in 1975
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009). The
access to IOs has as well increased dramatically, by a factor of three since
1975 (see Tallberg et al. 2013, 68).
A special version of this type of public authority arises when an epistemic
authority is assigned to that status by political institutions. Then we may
speak of ‘politically assigned epistemic authorities’ (PAEAs). It is especially
this type of authority that has gained enormously in importance and has
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changed the constellation in the exercise of public power. At the transna-
tional as well as the international level, such politically assigned epistemic
authorities have moved into the focus of attention particularly during the
past two decades. The rating agencies, the Intergovernmental Board for
Accounting Standards (Büthe and Mattli 2011), the International Panel for
Climate Change (Beck 2012) and the international evaluation institutions
in the area of environmental policy in general (Mitchell et al. 2006), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the
area of educational policy (Martens and Jakobi 2010), and international
courts (cf. Alter 2011; Bogdandy and Venzke 2014) are all political insti-
tutions that have become more influential over the past two decades. In
general, the authority of IOs has risen steeply regarding the policy functions
of agenda setting, knowledge generation, and norm interpretation (Zürn
et al. 2015), pointing to the growing relevance of PAEAs. While a com-
prehensive systematic survey of this type of authority – including both
international and transnational institutions – is still lacking, it appears that,
particularly in recent decades, it has increased enormously in significance.
While the rise of PAEAs is most visible in global governance, we can see
related developments on the national level. Ethics commissions, rankings,
and benchmarking have gained importance in the domestic context as well.
This rise of PAEAs goes hand in hand with non-majoritarian institutions,
which act exactly in the field between decisions and interpretations. One
example is Constitutional Courts. Hirschl (2004, 1) points out that ‘[o]ver
the past few years the world has witnessed an astonishingly rapid transition
to what may be called juristocracy. Around the globe, in more than eighty
countries and in several transnational entities constitutional reform has
transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative insti-
tutions to judiciaries’. A very similar development can be discerned with
respect to central banks. They have been gradually introduced in many
countries, and their independence has been strengthened. Between 1990
and 2008, no fewer than 84 countries passed legislation to enhance
the formal autonomy of central banks (Rapaport et al. 2009; see also
Cukierman 2008). At the same time, the importance of monetary policy
tools in the general economic control toolbox has principally increased with
the spread of monetarism. Central banks thus became more autonomous
and more important. Ultimately, however, they are only the manifestation
of a broader development: the increase in so-called ‘independent agencies’
(Shapiro 1997). According to a quantitative study, ‘autonomous regulatory
agencies’ play a role in 73% of all policy areas in the countries under
investigation (Jordana et al. 2011). The study shows steady quantitative
growth between 1966 and 2007, becoming almost exponential in the
1990s, and declining slightly only after the turn of the century.
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Reflexive authorities can be influential in spite of being liquid instead of
being solid. No one doubts that the WTO, the OECD, rating agencies,
international courts, constitutional courts, and central banks – to name but
a few – are consequential. Their commonality is that they exercise reflexive
authority, which is either objectivized or institutionalized, but cannot be
backed with force by these authorities. As opposed to traditional authority,
reflexive authority is always dynamic and contested. It contains, however, a
tendency toward institutionalization and therefore can gradually move
away from the pole of liquidity – although it is unlikely to be internalized
moving fully to the solidity pole.
Legitimation of reflexive authorities
When reflexive authority is perpetuated, the voluntariness of subordina-
tion, as well as the liquidity of authority, is reduced. Perpetuation thus
shifts the balance of voluntary subordination away from the voluntary
side of the equation. It is for this reason that the need for legitimation
is a constitutive component of the conceptualization of reflexive authority.
To the extent that authority gets perpetuated via objectivization and
institutionalization, there is a need for legitimating the relationship.
Therefore, the rise of authority ‘is normally accompanied by the permanent
attempt to arouse and nurse the beliefs in legitimacy’ (Weber 2013b,
450; trans. Michael Zürn). This attempt may or may not be successful –
that is, it may or may not lead to legitimate authority (see also Black
2017).8
An appeal to the public interest, or to the common good of the collective
that is being regulated, represents the foundation of any legitimation
and legitimate authority (see Macdonald and Macdonald 2017). Even
traditional and religious justifications are embedded in narratives that
emphasize the common good, and may work successfully in specific
circumstances even today. Yet, faith in legitimacy in any case dissipates
immediately if the rulers are perceived as being exclusively self-serving or
selfish.
The mere reference to the common good, however, is insufficient as a
legitimation strategy in modernity. The public interest claim needs to be
supplemented with a reference to sources and procedures by means of
which the public authority could indeed give the appearance of serving
the common good. On the basis of a set of different sources through
which the exercise of public authority can be bound to the common good,
8 This requires, of course, disentangling the concept of legitimacy from the concept of
authority (see Zürn et al. 2012).
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we may distinguish four dominant narratives of legitimation for public
authority.9
Authority was, for a long time, a concept emphasized by conservatives
(see Eschenburg 1976; Furedi 2013), one of the reasons of which is that
tradition served as the most important legitimation of authority – especially
pre-modern authority. The basic justification is that long-standing
practices could not be long-standing if they were false. The ‘traditionalist
legitimation narrative’ can come in different embodiments as religion or
the traditional right of certain families to rule. It is closely associated to
habituation and the dull obedience, based on the acceptance of a certain
worldview with disciplinary effects as emphasized by Foucault (1980)
and others. The traditionalist legitimation narrative is often used to justify
solid authorities, but is hardly used by transnational and international
institutions.
The ‘technocratic legitimation narrative’ is mainly based on results or
output (Scharpf 1999). The process of decision making is only secondary in
this account. Good policy results are based on non-prejudiced ‘expertise
and knowledge of the facts’. This expertise is derived from the concept of
science as an independent search for knowledge, with no regard for parti-
cular interests, based on a systematic methodology. Connected with this is
the hope for successful goal-oriented policies that especially promote the
welfare of the community and generally support solutions to problems.
This technocratic legitimation is often accompanied by the idea of
‘accountability’. However, accountability should not be confused with
democracy in this context. Accountability does not require the participation
of those affected by regulations in specific decisions; it merely makes the
decision makers responsible ex post for the decisions they have made –
legally, electorally, or in some other way.10 At issue here is control, not
participation.
The ‘liberal or legal narrative of legitimation’ is based on the ‘protection
of basic rights and the promotion of legal equality’. Especially in liberal
thinking, individual rights and legal equality constrain the exercise of
authority (Tamanaha 2004). At the same time, the reference to decisions
that protect and promote individual rights can have a legitimacy-generating
effect. National and international courts play a key role in this legitimation
narrative, which moves it closer to the technocratic narrative.
9 In their treatments of separation of powers, Ackerman (2000) and Möllers (2013) see three
of these four legitimation narratives present in democracies. In contrast to the other three, the
traditionalist legitimation narrative has no place in normative theory.
10 See Buchanan and Keohane (2006), who define accountability as a function of
transparency and possibility to sanction.
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Finally, the ‘participatory legitimation narrative’ is based on the ‘equal
opportunity of participation’ of all those affected by regulation, or at least
of all those to whom the regulations are addressed (Dahl 1989). Participa-
tion may be carried out directly or via representation. Representation
can be organized functionally or territorially. Accountability is absolutely
central to the concept of political representation. In institutional terms,
participation and representation mechanisms may be represented in mul-
tiple and strongly differing ways. In addition, the theory of deliberative
democracy refers to a further procedural source of democratic legitimacy:
public discourse and contestation. It is based on the normative conviction
that the aggregation of interests must, in the course of participation or
representation, be accompanied by an open dispute regarding the common
good (Habermas 1994).
Implications
The concept of reflexive authority provides a reason-based account of
liquid authority (see Krisch 2017). It rests on the knowledge about the
limitations of one’s own rationality, and thus the dependence on epistemic
constructions that identify these limits. At the same time, it is always under
close scrutiny by the receivers of authority. Reflexive authority therefore
has a built-in tendency toward liquidity. This may be countered, to some
extent, by the tendency toward institutionalization. Due to this institutio-
nalization, the voluntariness of subordination however gets qualified,
which, in turn, makes legitimation necessary (see also Black 2017).
In the remainder, I want to show that this re-conceptualization is con-
sequential by pointing to implications that are different from the expectations
that can be derived from the concept of solid authority. Both of these impli-
cations point to processes via which authority becomes even more liquid.
From constitutional rule to loosely coupled spheres of authority
Rule/domination and authority as forms of power are both based on recognition
and deference. Yet, the two terms can be – contrary to Weber11 – distinguished
according to their scope. Authority, then, is a functionally differentiated form
of a right to do something; it is specialized in the sense that it is
11 The proposition that Weber used authority [Autorität] and domination/rule [Herrschaft]
synonymously is based on an edition in which the sociology of domination was authorized by
Weber himself (Borchardt et al. 2013). Contrary to earlier versions edited by Marianne Weber
and JohannesWinckelmann, he uses the two terms consistently interchangeably. See Simmerl and
Zürn (2016) for a more detailed discussion.
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limited to certain tasks and functions.12 The authority of the driving instructor is
an example. In contrast, rule refers to a social relationship as a whole – as
in themaster–slave relationship.We therefore speak of political rule if a political
system that can potentially take action regarding all issues has developed,
and thus involves a meta-authority to decide on issues about which different
spheres of authority are in conflict. System-wide rule typically also involves
the backing-up through institutionalized force. Whereas rule, in this use of the
term, is encompassing or systemic, and often involves the recognition that force
can be used in order to enforce rules, authority is more limited to specific
issues and functions, and it does not necessarily involve the acceptance of
rule enforcement. While courts hold authority, the modern state with its
monopoly of the legitimate use of force and a general responsibility for the
development of a given society exercises rule. To the extent that the state is
depersonalized and that the rulers are bound by rules as well, it may be
considered as a constitutionalized rule. Constitutionalism thus points to a system
of rule that allows a community to govern itself (foundational aspect), but
imposes limits on the freedom of choice for the rulers (limitational aspect).
This notion of constitutionalism is most often associated with a demo-
cratic political system in which parliaments – in connection with the
government – play the decisive role. As both parliaments and governments
in democratic political systems consist of elected representatives – who, in
turn, are organized in political parties – they are, at the same time, the most
typical cases of ‘majoritarian institutions’; that is, those institutions that are
legitimated on the basis of a participatory narrative. Non-majoritarian
institutions, such as courts and central banks, do play an important role in
democratic political systems as well. Non-majoritarian institutions can be
defined as governance entities ‘that (a) possess and exercise some grant of
specialized public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but
(b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by
elected officials’ (Thatcher and Sweet 2002, 2). They are most often based
on a technocratic or legal legitimation narrative. In democratic theory, their
major task is to control and limit the public powers, and to implement the
norms set by the legislative.13 In this conception of democratic rule, par-
liaments are the norm setters and, together with the executive, are
12 Note that limited scope is different from the limitations of authorities derived from the
separation of powers. Both an institution with limited scope – like the WTO – and an encom-
passing state can have a separation of powers. See Möllers (2013) and Venzke (2016) for
stimulating discussions on the separation of powers principle in the context of rising international
authority.
13 See the contributions in Preuß (1994), especially by Stephen Holmes and Jon Elster. See
also Ackerman (2000) und Möllers (2013).
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considered the most important majoritarian institutions that stand for the
foundational component of constitutionalism. Non-majoritarian institu-
tions have a mainly limitational function.
It is this constitutionalized systemof rule based onmajoritarian institutions
that has lost in relevance and importance in the last decades. Instead, mostly
specialized authorities – somewhat independent of the constitutionalized rule
and most often not backed by force – have gained major relevance and
importance. Without a question, such functional and non-majoritarian
authorities have always been there and were part of the model of constitu-
tional democracy. Yet, in the last decades – so the first thesis goes –
specialized authorities have risen in quantity and quality so that the
integrated institutional system of democratic constitutionalism is now being
challenged by a system of loosely coupled spheres of authority14 that not only
play a limitational, but also a foundational role – that is, a norm setting one.
While the fully developed political rule in the form of the territorial state is
fraying at the edges, specialized public authorities of different types have, in
recent decades, increased in significance – both on national and international,
as well as transnational levels. They have significantly undermined the notion
of democratic rule based on national parliaments. These extra-parliamentary
institutions control the executive, and give outsiders a voice – they create, in
the words of Keane (2009), a new historical form of democracy; the ‘monitory
democracy’. This is good news. But this development contains bad news as
well. These authorities do not only implement and control policies – as
foreseen by the notion of democratic constitutionalism – they also are strongly
involved in setting norms and rules, directly or indirectly. Moreover, these
new public authorities have gained independence from the majoritarian
institutions of the constitutional state.
Especially when it comes to transnational and international institutions,
we face a set of plural authorities that can collide with each other sectorally,
as well as with constitutionalized states. Leaving the era of neatly separated
territorial states does not lead us to a world state, or to a moving of the
constitutional state to a higher level. There is no constitutionalized place for
the final decision. It may be too far-fetched to talk about full-scale institu-
tional fragmentation, yet it is an institutional architecture that lacks
centralized coordination15 – which is why we move from encompassing
constitutional rule to plural and only loosely coupled spheres of authority.
14 Each sphere contains at least one site of institutionalized authority. We still speak of one
sphere of authority if it consists of different sites of authorities that coordinate with each other.
15 Scholars of international institutions talk about regime complexity in this context (see, e.g.
Keohane and Victor 2011) and point to an adaptive coordination between different institutions
at best (see Gehring and Faude 2013).
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A system of loosely coupled spheres of authority is however full of interface
conflicts, forum shopping, and mutual adjustment of partially competing
authorities. This adds to the liquidity of reflexive authorities.
The paradox of the democratic legitimation narrative
The second implication that needs sketching refers to changed legitimation
processes that are associated with the rise of loosely coupled spheres of
reflexive authorities. As mentioned, it is mainly constitutional rule that
builds primarily on the participatory legitimation narrative. Parties,
parliaments, and governments refer to participation and public opinion, to
votes and voices when they justify their exercise of authority. They are often
backed by the tradition of the nation and the symbols of the state and the
nation. On the contrary, central banks, regulatory agencies, and also
transnational and international institutions display primarily a technocratic
legitimation narrative when justifying their authority. In general, their
legitimation narrative points to effectiveness, wealth, and superior knowl-
edge. Politically assigned epistemic authorities emphasize expertise even
more than international political authorities that often also emphasize
accountability to member states. National and international courts, in
addition, build on the liberal narrative of legitimation; that is, the protec-
tion of individual rights and the rule of law. In general, the legitimation of
spheres of authority mainly depends on results and their ability to adapt
to new circumstances (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012; see also Macdonald and
Macdonald 2017) (Figure 1).
At first sight, this looks like a logical and smooth development, as it is in
line with reasoning about different legitimacy standards for different types
of authority (Majone 1994; Moravcsik 2006). A fully constitutionalized
political system of rule is most strongly dependent on democratic legiti-
macy. By contrast, a purely epistemic authority requires hardly any addi-
tional legitimation, for its authority stems exclusively from the credibility
of its assessments. Politically assigned epistemic authority requires rather
greater efforts for legitimation. Especially the possible suspicion of parti-
sanship must be eliminated. For example, panels of experts need not only
demonstrate the expertise of their members, but also a certain degree of
plurality of representation. In any case, limited public authorities seem to be
less demanding in terms of legitimation than the constitutionalized state.
However, a second look makes clear that the simplified graphical pre-
sentation should not hide all the disruptions and nonlinearities involved in
this development. It has its ups and downs, and it is often challenged – by
political parties on the right and left that want to empower the people, as
well as by states defending their national sovereignty.
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The movement from encompassing constitutional rule to plural and only
loosely coupled spheres of authority will, therefore, not necessarily go on
indefinitely. One of the reasons for this is that it involves an inconsistence in
the currently dominant belief system about the legitimation of authority and
rule. On the one hand, democracy is, according to survey data, accepted
worldwide as a desirable political order. In all countries covered by the
World Values Survey, the majority of respondents are in favor of democracy.
With only two exceptions (Colombia and Russia), this view is taken by more
than 80% of the population. On the other hand, political institutions that do
not draw on genuinely democratic sources of legitimation – central banks,
constitutional courts, independent agencies, the EU, and international
institutions – are gaining in importance throughout the world. As a result of
this development, the effective power of political institutions that justify
themselves on participatory and majoritarian grounds is reduced.
This contradiction fully plays out and becomes an inconsistency in the
dominant belief system when we look at survey data that show widespread
backing for this development in society. People in parliamentary democ-
racies seem to especially like epistemic authorities, whereas they dislike
mostly the political institutions that are inherently connected to democratic
rule in a constitutionalized state: parties and parliaments. Among the
multitude of public institutions, political parties in the United States and the
EU consistently scored worst on confidence, worse even than big business
and the media. Parliaments, too, score badly, generally ranking in the last
four of 12 public institutions (Norris 2011).
Figure 1 From democratic rule to loosely coupled spheres of authority.
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Compared with parties and parliaments, constitutional courts and cen-
tral banks have a very high reputation in most countries. In many countries,
especially in Germany, the constitutional court consistently outscores all
other national political institutions. More generally, in all 22 countries
covered by the 2008 European Social Survey, people had greater confidence
in the legal system than in parliament and parties. International institutions
are also grounded in a remarkable degree of recognition. In the parlia-
mentary democracies of the West, the United Nations enjoys greater poli-
tical trust than national parties and parliaments (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009, 34). The succeeding
waves of the World Values Survey reports even show that a majority of
people in the world has confidence in the United Nations (Furia 2005).
There has thus been a remarkable internal shift in key legitimation
sources in western democracies. Established majoritarian procedures in
parliamentary democracies have lost strongly, not only with regard to
relevance in political decision-making processes, but also with respect to
public support. As far as attitudes are concerned, dissatisfaction with the
core institutions of parliamentary democracy – such as parliaments and
parties – contrasts with the considerable esteem enjoyed by epistemic
authorities. Therefore, the core institutions for majority formation – which
define the realm of politics in the narrower sense – are viewed with an
extremely critical eye, whereas institutions empowered to make decisions
affecting society as a whole while escaping from the political process, such
as central banks, constitutional courts, and international institutions, have
a much better standing in public opinion than the core democratic institu-
tions. One may label this as ‘democratic paradox’: while participatory
democracy requires a constitutionalized system of rule in which especially
the coordination of governance and the delegation of authorities is demo-
cratically controlled, the people who, in principle, are in favor of democracy
trust especially non-majoritarian institutions that are beyond the reach of
majoritarian institutions.
This democratic paradox can be expected to create precarious dynamics
in the processes of political legitimation. As a result, the process of legiti-
mation becomes reflexive as well, and conflicts over which justification is
appropriate for which form of political authority may arise more and
more.16 In most of the 20th century, the question about legitimacy was one
in which the standards of democratic decision making in national political
systems were more or less consented and uncontested. The legitimacy
16 See Zürn et al. (2007); Zürn et al. (2012); and Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2013) for studies
that show an increasing politicization of international institutions.
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question was whether and to which extent these standards were fulfilled.
Today, those very standards are contested. In such reflexive legitimation
conflicts, not only the question ‘Was the decision compatible with democratic
constitutionalism?’, but also the standards themselves get questioned; not only
the ‘what’ (What counts as effective basis for legitimation?) gets disputed, but
also the ‘who’ (Who decides about this?) and the ‘how’ (How and under which
conditions can we answer these questions and institutionalize the answers?)
have begun to be debated.17 It, therefore, can be expected that reflexive
authority will lead to reflexivity in legitimation conflicts. These legitimation
conflicts will affect the authorities, adding further to their liquidity.
Conclusion
Authority relationships in global governance are reflexive. Reflexive
authority’s state of aggregation is ceteris paribus more liquid than tradi-
tional authority. To the extent that the built-in tendency toward institu-
tionalization takes effect, reflexive authority moves away from liquidity
toward the solidity end of the spectrum. This is especially the case when the
institutionalization is the outcome of delegation by traditional authorities.
However, this counterforce can be expected to have a limited effect. Over
time, reflexive authority produces social dynamics that even increase
liquidity over time. Namely, the loose coupling of reflexive authorities and
their specific legitimation problems produce fragmentation and contesta-
tion, which, in turn, lead to a permanent competition and mutual adjust-
ments of reflexive authorities. The concept of reflexive authority thus
provides a reason-based account of increased liquidity and dynamism of
public authority. Whereas the concept of liquid authority mainly sheds light
on the form (or the aggregate state) of transnational and international
institutions, reflexive authority elaborates its social foundation. While
simple authority most often appears in solid form, reflexive authority in
general tends to be more liquid.
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